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Chapter 10
Peace process or just peace deal? The media’s 
failure to cover peace
Virgil Hawkins
In general, the news media in the West do not appear to be particularly 
interested in the outside world. Coverage has decreased considerably 
from the Cold War days when foreign news accounted for up to 45 
percent of the time allocated for network television in the US (Moisy 
1996, p9). This is of course paradoxical, given the growing connectedness 
of the world, and the fact that advancing information and communica-
tions technology increasingly allows the media to gather news from and 
transmit it to more of the world more quickly than it ever has before. 
It is also paradoxical given the proliferation of media corporations that 
appear to have gone global, and the rise of the internet, obviating the 
need for media audiences to be gathered in a single geographical space, 
easily reachable by physical forms of communication.
Within the limited media coverage of the world in the US, there 
are high levels of disproportion, largely along lines of geography, 
culture and socioeconomic status (Tai 2000). Perhaps most notably, 
the African continent finds itself considerably marginalised in Western 
media coverage (Golan 2008; Franks 2010). This can also be seen in 
the coverage of conflicts and peace processes (Hawkins 2002; Beaudoin 
& Thorson 2002, p57), resulting in stealth conflicts – those that go on 
largely without appearing on the media ‘radar’. This marginalisation 
occurs despite the fact that conflicts in Africa have accounted for up 
to 88 percent of the world’s conflict-related deaths since the end of the 
Cold War (Hawkins 2008, pp12–25). 
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Stealth conflicts are of particular concern considering the role of 
the media in the agenda-setting process that links actors in a position to 
respond to conflict. The media, particularly in the centres of power in 
the West, have the potential to influence public and policy responses to 
conflict, including expressions of concern, humanitarian aid, diplomatic 
pressure and, in some exceptional cases, military intervention. In this 
sense, the failure of the media to respond to conflict can also contribute 
to the lack of response to conflict by other actors. This is not to suggest 
that greater media coverage of a conflict will necessarily contribute 
to policies that will alleviate suffering and perhaps help move the 
conflict in the direction of a peaceful conclusion. Media coverage can 
often contribute to responses that have a negative impact on a conflict 
situation: through framing that does not reflect the reality on the 
ground, by oversimplification, and by taking sides. By the same token, 
much can be said for the potential of the media to influence public and 
policy responses in a positive way.
Does the disproportion in coverage levels seen in response to 
violent phases of conflict apply also to peace processes? This chapter 
examines the levels of media coverage that peace processes aimed at 
ending such stealth conflicts receive, relative to other more visible con-
flicts. It is based largely on a quantitative comparison of coverage of the 
peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with that 
in Israel–Palestine. It finds that there was proportionately less coverage 
of the peace process in the former case than there was in the latter, and 
that coverage was so limited and sporadic in the former that the media 
failed to refer to the series of events leading to the peace agreement as a 
‘process’. The chapter then goes on to discuss why this is so.
media coverage of peace processes
Peace is a process, not an event. It is not two signatures at the bottom of 
a document or a handshake among former enemies. This process neces-
sarily goes far beyond any formal agreement, both in terms of time and 
in terms of how agreements are translated into change on the ground in 
the societies in question. And peace is not simply limited to the absence 
of violence (‘negative peace’), but it can also be seen as a condition in 
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which the root conflict, or causes of the violence, are eliminated (‘posi-
tive peace’) (Galtung 1985). Nor are peace processes the sole domain 
of elite players – the contribution of grassroots efforts should not be 
underestimated. For the purposes of this study, however, the use of the 
term ‘peace process’ will be limited to the time period starting at the 
point of substantive negotiations aimed at stopping violent confronta-
tion, and ending at the conclusion of (or the failure to conclude) a peace 
agreement. Provisionally using this narrow definition permits a quantita-
tive evaluation of media coverage of peace processes according to what 
could be considered to reflect the media’s own definition of the term.
How do the media perform in covering ‘peace processes’ in this 
sense? While very little research has been conducted on this question, 
it is safe to say that the media perform quite poorly. In many cases, 
most of the little coverage that there is of conflict is focused on the 
violent phase, with very little on the peace process, or on the phases that 
precede and follow the violence (Jakobsen 2000). Indeed, the ‘needs’ of 
media corporations in going about the business of constructing news 
do not fit well with the needs of peace processes.
A successful peace process requires patience, and the news media 
demand immediacy. Peace is most likely to develop within a calm 
environment and the media have an obsessive interest in threats and 
violence. Peace building is a complex process and the news media deal 
with simple events. (Wolfsfeld et al. 2008, p374)
 Media coverage of conflicts tends to be based on ‘violence journalism’, 
in which conflict is a battle between two sides, not unlike the coverage 
of a sports event in which two teams contest victory (Lynch & Galtung 
2010, pp1–8).
Such ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ newsroom mentalities can be widely 
observed in the end product, the levels of media coverage of conflict 
situations. Various studies have found news of the world being dominated 
by negativity – conflict, violence and crisis (Beaudoin & Thorson 2002, 
pp48–49; Williams 2004, pp44–45). Peace processes themselves often 
seem to attract little coverage, and coverage of a conflict tends to 
quickly evaporate when the peace agreement is concluded. But this is 
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not always the case. A limited number of peace processes do manage to 
attract considerable coverage. A study of coverage of the world in the 
Los Angeles Times, for example, found that 60 percent of stories focusing 
on the Middle East referred to conflict resolution (Beaudoin & Thorson 
2002, p57). This was not the case for Africa. Only 16 percent of stories 
focusing on Africa referred to conflict resolution, and Africa accounted 
for just four percent of all conflict resolution stories recorded. 
As noted above, news of peace has an inherent disadvantage in 
attracting coverage – ‘reporters search for “action” and when they find 
it their editors are more likely to place these stories in a prominent 
position’ (Wolfsfeld 2004, p20). But while peace in itself may appear 
serene, inactive and thereby not newsworthy, peace processes are 
not necessarily uneventful or without drama. There is the tension of 
bitter foes coming to sit at the same table, the outbreaks of residual 
violence that threaten to ruin the process, the threats of walkouts, the 
breakthroughs along the way, the anticipation of a successful outcome, 
and (hopefully) the jubilation and celebration when an agreement is 
finally reached. This may be followed by the withdrawal of troops and 
perhaps historic elections. The secrecy of the negotiations could also 
contribute to the excitement of the proceedings. Not as dramatic as 
explosions and killings, admittedly, but there is certainly room for some 
form of ‘action’ or drama. 
This kind of drama is most likely the basis for the coverage of peace 
processes that does make it to the newspapers and television stations. 
Beaudoin and Thorson’s finding that there is, in fact, substantive 
coverage of conflict resolution – in some places rather than others – 
serves as a useful starting point for analysis. It raises the question of why 
some peace processes are able to attract considerable media coverage 
where others are not. With a view to addressing this question, this 
study is concerned with issue salience in the media agenda – the ‘what 
is covered’ (and, importantly, the ‘what is not covered’) rather than the 
‘how it is covered’. That is, it is about objects (first-level or traditional 
agenda-setting) rather than the attributes (second-level agenda-setting) 
(McCombs 2004, pp69–71). While the question of how a peace process 
is covered is certainly an important one, and more coverage does not 
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necessarily contribute to a positive outcome (it can, as previously 
mentioned, often have a negative impact), quantity of coverage must 
also be taken into consideration. This is particularly the case given 
that coverage of peace processes is often negligible, meaning that even 
the potential for a positive impact is absent. Where coverage is absent, 
so too are incentives for elite involvement in mediation efforts, the 
application of pressure on the parties to the conflict, and other forms of 
support for the process. It is in this sense that this study focuses on the 
quantity of coverage.
By examining the levels of media coverage of the peace process that 
brought an official end to the conflict in the DRC – a stealth conflict 
consistently marginalised by the media in the outside world – and 
comparing it to the coverage of other more visible peace processes, 
this study hopes to contribute to our understanding of the media’s 
perspectives on peace.
The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo
The conflict in the DRC may be the deadliest of our times. It saw the 
direct involvement of armed forces from nine countries (and the indi-
rect involvement of many others), and numerous non-state forces, 
both foreign and local. It was simultaneously a series of international, 
national and local conflicts and became known as Africa’s First World 
War. In a series of mortality surveys conducted by the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC), the death toll was estimated at 1.7 million 
in 2000, 2.5 million in 2001, 3.3 million in 2003, 3.8 million in 2004, 
and 5.4 million in 2008 (IRC 2008). The results have recently been 
disputed by the Human Security Report Project as being far too high 
(HSRP 2010), but for the purposes of this study, it is important to note 
that during the period examined here (2001–2003) the ‘known’ (then 
undisputed) death toll stood at 2.5 million (IRC 2001), making it by far 
the deadliest conflict since the end of the Cold War.
In terms of a peace process, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) 
from late 2001 to early 2003 (particularly 2002) is arguably the period 
most worthy of examination. While there had been a peace agreement 
before this (the Lusaka Agreement of 1999 set up the ICD but was 
Expanding peace journalism
266
regarded as a failure), and while the conflict has continued at varying 
degrees of intensity at a local level (with foreign sponsorship) after the 
conclusion of the ICD, this phase of the peace process culminated in 
the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the establishment of a transitional 
government and the official end of the conflict. 
This was not a peace deal agreed upon in secret that suddenly 
took the outside world by surprise, nor was it a series of impasses or 
frustrating blocking manoeuvres from uncommitted parties that 
bore no fruit. The talks were presided over by a former head of state 
(Ketumile Masire of Botswana), in Ethiopia and then in South Africa. 
There were setbacks, walkouts and some fighting on the ground (at one 
point rebels captured a town, prompting the government delegation to 
walk out, only returning when the rebels promised to withdraw), and 
yet there was progress and a series of major and conclusive agreements 
(Apuuli 2004). The results of these agreements – large-scale troop 
withdrawals by foreign forces (30 000 troops from Rwanda alone) and 
the establishment of a transitional government – were quite tangible 
and visible. In short, this was an event-filled conclusion to the world’s 
deadliest conflict – there was plenty of ‘news’ to be reported. And yet 
very little of this process was being reported, and what was, was done so 
in a very piecemeal and disjointed manner.
Table 1: Timeline of the Inter-Congolese dialogue (ICd) (2001–2003)
Date Event Result
15–23 Oct 01 ICd opens in Addis 
Ababa
Talks break down
26 Feb to 
19 Apr 02
ICd resumes with 
talks in sun City
Agreement on power sharing 
framework reached
25–30 jul 02 Rwanda–dRC peace 
talks
Bilateral peace agreement
6 sep 02 uganda–dRC peace 
talks
Bilateral peace agreement
5 Oct 02 Withdrawal of 
Rwandan troops 
ends
Complete withdrawal confirmed
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Date Event Result
30 Oct 02 Withdrawal of 
Zimbabwean, 
Angolan, namibian 
troops ends
Complete withdrawal confirmed
25 Oct to 
17 dec 02
Talks in Pretoria 
by all Congolese 
parties to conflict, 
political opposition, 
civil society
Comprehensive power sharing 
agreement reached, formal end 
of conflict
2 Apr 03 Pretoria agreement 
ratified in sun City
Conclusion of the ICd
4 Apr 03 Promulgation 
of transitional 
constitution
In order to examine how extensively this peace process was covered 
by the media in the outside world, a study was conducted of media 
coverage by The New York Times (US), The Times (UK), The Globe 
and Mail (Canada), and The Australian (Australia). Leading media 
sources from the US and the UK were selected because of their ability 
to influence the global information flow and the level of interest/
response of other powerful global actors. Media sources from Canada 
and Australia were selected to examine the pervasiveness of trends in 
the global information flow. While both are Western countries, they can 
be seen as being distinct from the more powerful US and UK: Canada 
in terms of the government’s approach to foreign affairs issues, and 
Australia in terms of its geographic distance from the centres of power. 
The particular newspapers selected are known as newspapers of record 
in their respective countries. While this particular study looks only 
at English language media, it can be noted here that previous studies 
on the levels of coverage of conflict that included non-English media 
sources found comparatively higher levels of coverage on the DRC in 
the French language media than English language media, and almost 
insignificant levels of coverage in the Japanese media (Hawkins 2002; 
2008, pp109–11).
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Using the LexisNexis database, a search was conducted for articles 
on the DRC during the period of the ICD. Articles were separated 
into those that focused primarily on the ongoing peace process and 
those that did not, including reporting centred around fighting and 
humanitarian suffering, as well as reporting unrelated to the conflict 
(such as volcanic eruptions and Belgium’s apology for its role in the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba). As many articles contained a mix 
of these topics, articles coded as those focusing primarily on the peace 
process were determined to be those in which the coverage of the peace 
process accounted for more than half the article. Coverage of the peace 
process here included that of the progress of the peace talks (successes 
and failures) and their aftermath (in this case most notably foreign troop 
withdrawals), initiatives, gestures and the interventions and application 
of pressure by outside parties.
None of the sources studied appeared to show much interest in the 
peace process. While The New York Times, for example, did at least cover 
each of the events in Table 1, it did so in very little depth. Perhaps most 
telling is the fact that 65 percent (31 of 48) of all articles focusing on 
the peace process were not full articles, but world briefings, none being 
more than 130 words in length. In fact the average length of an article 
on the peace process in this period was just 263 words. Of the events 
in the course of the ICD, the peace agreement between Rwanda and 
the DRC attracted the most coverage (five articles and one briefing), 
and the withdrawals were also covered. The Sun City peace talks that 
preceded this were mostly glossed over in world briefings, and, by the 
time talks were underway in Pretoria, what interest there was had mostly 
been lost. A world briefing mentioned that talks were resuming, but no 
updates were offered on the progress of the talks until two months later, 
when a single article informed readers that the Pretoria agreement had 
been signed. While this article did contain some information on the 
agreement and some background of the conflict, no analysis or follow-
up articles were printed after this.
The New York Times had more to say about the peace process than 
the other sources studied. The Times printed a series of substantive 
articles on the Rwanda–DRC peace agreement, but little more. Only 
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one substantive article was produced on the Sun City talks (231 words 
noting that the talks had collapsed) and none was forthcoming on the 
Pretoria talks or agreement or the ratification of the deal in Sun City in 
2003 (world briefings are not included in the LexisNexis database for 
The Times and were not examined). The most detailed article dealing 
with the DRC in general was a 2874-word article by a reporter travelling 
with UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, 
on a four-day tour of the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. It is 
essentially a travel/adventure diary (not a news article) with hints of 
colonial nostalgia: they were ‘buccaneers’ who faced spies, rebels 
and food poisoning, and crossed the Congo River in a pirogue 
(Treneman 2002).
Canada’s The Globe and Mail first acknowledged the existence of 
the peace talks in March 2002, with a 35-word brief noting that the 
DRC Government had pulled out of the peace talks in Sun City (it never 
mentioned there were talks going on to begin with). In the 18 months of 
the ICD, this newspaper published only four substantive articles on the 
entire peace process – one on the Rwanda–DRC peace deal, two (one 
article and one editorial) on the Pretoria agreement, and one editorial 
after the final Sun City agreement. With no apparent irony, the article 
on the Rwanda–DRC deal opens with the words ‘It’s a forgotten war’ 
(Nolen 2002), and the final editorial, entitled ‘The invisible war’ invites 
readers to ‘Spare a thought for the war that is not being brought live to 
living rooms across North America’ (Anon 2003). In total, briefings that 
averaged 53 words accounted for 78 percent (14 of 18) of the articles 
published on the peace process.
The Australian newspaper took no half measures in its 
marginalisation of the DRC peace process. It needed only 672 words 
to cover the entire 18 months of the ICD: 41 words to note that talks 
would be starting in Addis Ababa, 37 words to report that Rwanda and 
the DRC would sign a deal, 568 words when that deal was signed, and 
26 words after the ratification of the comprehensive agreement in April 
2003. The newspaper missed the crucial talks and agreements at Sun 
City and Pretoria altogether. Oddly enough, in the same period it did 
report on other news in the DRC, such as the eruption of a volcano, 
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students arrested for protesting high school fees, 17 people killed in a 
freak storm, illegal miners killed after being sealed into a mine, and 
alleged cannibalism. It had more to say in a single article about a Congo 
exhibition in Belgium than it did about the entire course of the peace 
process (Sutherland 2002). See Hawkins (2009) for a more detailed look 
at the coverage of the DRC conflict in The Australian.
Some comparisons
It is useful to examine how the coverage of the peace process in the 
DRC compares to that of other peace processes. This section will begin 
by comparing the coverage in The New York Times of the peace process 
in the DRC in 2002 with coverage of the Israel–Palestine peace process 
in 2003. It should be noted from the outset that the lessons that can be 
learned from comparing two very different peace processes at different 
stages are limited and certainly need to be handled with care. There are, 
however, some similarities between the two peace processes in these 
periods, and, by focusing on a period of one year, a very basic compari-
son is possible.
In both cases, there were movements in the peace processes 
throughout the course of the year. Major agreements were debated for a 
number of months and were adopted. In both cases, agreements saw the 
withdrawal of foreign forces – Israeli forces from northern Gaza, and all 
foreign forces (except Uganda) from the DRC. The involvement in the 
process of the US at the presidential level in the Israel–Palestine case is 
clearly a major difference between the two, and this could be expected 
to serve as a major boost to coverage. On the other hand, whereas the 
Israel–Palestine case was a debate on a ‘road map’ towards an agreement 
(not by any means an agreement in itself), the DRC case saw the 
successful conclusion of a number of both international (bilateral) and 
national comprehensive agreements and the official end to the conflict. 
Furthermore, the DRC conflict was known to be the world’s deadliest, 
with a death toll hundreds of times greater than that in Israel–Palestine. 
These points could conceivably have justified a boost in coverage of the 
DRC peace process.
A quantitative study of media coverage is clearly not needed to tell 
us that there was more coverage of the Israel–Palestinian peace process 
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than there was of the DRC peace process. The question is how much 
more? Two previous studies that compared the overall coverage of these 
conflicts (the violence, humanitarian issues and the peace processes 
combined) in The New York Times (one covering the year 2000, Hawkins 
2002; and one covering the year 2009 Hawkins unpublished) found that 
Israel–Palestine attracted 12–13 times more coverage than the DRC. 
This study, isolating the coverage of the peace processes (for 2002 in 
the case of the DRC and 2003 in the case of Israel–Palestine), found 
that there was 20 times more coverage for Israel–Palestine (more than 
225 000 words) than there was for the DRC. That is, the peace process 
of the DRC conflict attracted comparatively less attention than did the 
violence and humanitarian aspects. 
A similar comparison of the coverage of the DRC and Israel–
Palestine peace processes in The Australian sent the disproportion to 
new heights, with coverage of the Israel–Palestine peace process being 
115 times higher than coverage of the DRC peace process. In the case of 
The Globe and Mail, one day of coverage on the Israel–Palestine peace 
process (1 May 2003, when the ‘road map’ was unveiled) was more than 
enough to exceed the 18 months of coverage on the DRC peace process 
in that newspaper.
It is also worth pointing out that in The New York Times the average 
length of an article on the peace process in the case of Israel–Palestine 
was 864 words – almost three times longer than the average length of 
an article on the DRC peace process. This means that not only was there 
far more coverage of the Israel–Palestine peace process as a whole, but 
that each individual article dealt with the issue in far greater depth. The 
majority of articles on the peace process in the DRC simply noted, very 
briefly, that an event that had taken place (for example, talks breaking 
down, or a deal being signed), whereas articles on the peace process in 
Israel–Palestine included analysis, a variety of viewpoints, and depth. 
On a general methodological note, this also suggests that very different 
results may be obtained from quantitative studies of media coverage 
depending on whether numbers of articles are counted, or the numbers 
of words in the articles.
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Comparisons with other less extreme examples (cases considered 
less relevant to powerful political interests) can also help boost our 
understanding of the coverage of peace processes. In this light, this 
study also looked at coverage in The New York Times of peace processes 
in Darfur, Kenya and Nepal. In the case of Darfur, the study followed the 
conclusion of peace talks in Nigeria in May 2006 that resulted in a peace 
agreement with one faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (other 
groups did not sign). Substantive articles appeared in the paper on a 
daily basis for the first nine days of May, and in less than one month the 
quantity of reporting on the peace process for Darfur easily exceeded 
that for the 18 months of the DRC peace process.
An eruption of post-election violence left 1300 people dead and 
hundreds of thousands displaced in Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008. 
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan attempted to mediate, and 
an agreement on power sharing was reached in March 2008. Coverage 
of the conflict itself was relatively heavy in The New York Times, as was 
the peace process that led to the power sharing agreement. The roughly 
two months of coverage of the peace process exceeded the 18 months of 
the DRC peace process.
Conflict in Nepal between government and Maoist rebel forces, 
while far less deadly than that in the DRC, was deadlier than that in 
Israel–Palestine or Kenya, with an estimated death toll of 13  000 
people since 1996. The year 2006 saw the fall of the monarchy and a 
peace agreement with the rebels. The combined coverage of these two 
phases of the peace process in The New York Times (over a period of 
approximately eight months) was considerably greater than that for the 
course of the DRC peace process. 
Peace process or peace deal?
One of the products of a peace process is a peace agreement, or deal. 
Peace deals do not happen overnight. They are almost invariably the 
result of long and painstaking negotiations, accompanied at times by 
impasses, setbacks, walkouts, prodding by third parties, and compro-
mises. Such a ‘process’ may happen very quickly when one of the parties 
to the conflict vanquishes the other, as seen in Angola in 2002, Iraq 
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in 2003, and Sri Lanka in 2009 (the ‘agreement’ of the vanquished is 
not really required), or when the conflict itself is very short, as seen 
in Kenya in 2008, for example. In the majority of cases, however, the 
process leading to a deal is a long and complex one.
Figure 1: use of term ‘peace process’. The New York Times, 2000–2009 
(n=276).
But do the media portray the series of events leading up to a peace 
agreement as a peace process? In most cases, they appear not to. This 
study conducted a LexisNexis search of the term ‘peace process’ in 
the headline or lead paragraphs of The New York Times articles for the 
period from 2000 to 2009, and recorded the conflict to which the term 
was referring. Figure 1 is a summary of the results. Over the course of 
the ten years examined, more often than not (63 percent of cases) the 
term ‘peace process’ was used in reference to a single conflict – that in 
Israel–Palestine. A considerable number of references was also found 
for Northern Ireland, but the use of the term was a rarity beyond these 
two cases. In some instances, the term was used not by the reporter 
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writing the article, but by the political leader being interviewed (seen 
in the case of India–Pakistan and Somalia). In the case of the DRC, the 
term was used in just three articles with an average length of 107 words, 
and only one of these was during the course of the ICD. Interestingly, 
there also appears to be no ‘peace process’ for the two conflicts that are 
most heavily covered by the newspaper – those in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(there was only one reference for each), a reflection that the primary 
‘solution’ in each case has been considered a military one. 
The series of events that led to the Pretoria agreement in 2002, and 
its ratification in Sun City in 2003, was certainly a process. It had a clear 
beginning, a conclusion and a set of steps that got it from one to the 
other. It even had a name – the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. So why didn’t 
the media call it a ‘process’? In the case of Israel–Palestine, every twist 
and turn in the ‘road’ supposedly headed in the direction of peace has 
been reported – every proposal, every concession and gesture, every 
day of talks, every rejection and collapse. The dots along the timeline 
that has been presented by the media are so close together that there is 
somehow a connectedness, a sense of continuous action in a particular 
direction, however little apparent progress there had been. In the case 
of the DRC, however, the dots marked along the timeline were so few 
and far between (and so fleetingly and marginally recorded) that it 
was difficult for them to be connected in a coherent pattern, however 
process-like the series of events were. There were plenty of twists and 
turns along the road to the comprehensive peace agreement, but few 
of them were reported (or reported in any depth). As a result, the 
media reported the existence of a ‘deal’, ‘accord’ or ‘agreement’, but not 
a ‘process’.
The notion of ‘peace’ itself tends to be heavily associated by the 
media with the conflict in Israel–Palestine, something that can also been 
seen in the use of artwork in the media. A search for the word ‘dove’ (a 
symbol of peace) in the online collection of political cartoons on the 
website Politicalcartoons.com, for the period 2000 to 2009, revealed 
that of those cartoons that included imagery of doves in reference to 
a specific conflict, 56 percent were on Israel–Palestine (a further eight 
percent were on the Israel–Lebanon conflict). There were no such 
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cartoons appearing in reference to the DRC. The fact that the dove 
usually appeared in these cartoons about the Israel–Palestine conflict 
being eaten, blown up, decapitated, or otherwise maimed/threatened 
is ironically indicative of the fact that there has been little progress in 
achieving peace there. That the dove continues to be used primarily to 
refer to this particular conflict, regardless of this paradox, is indicative 
of how heavily the peace process there is being covered by the media.
What factors determined the coverage?
A number of studies have attempted to pin down the factors behind the 
newsworthiness of events. In 1965 Galtung and Ruge published a set of 
12 factors that they found to be key determinants: frequency, threshold, 
unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, 
composition, reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, ref-
erence to persons, and reference to something negative. Harcup and 
O’Neill (2001) reviewed these factors, made adjustments, and came up 
with the following ten, for the British press: the power elite, celebrity, 
entertainment, surprise, bad news, good news, magnitude, relevance, 
follow-up, and newspaper agenda. Golding and Elliott (1979) pub-
lished a similar set of criteria, but, critically, added proximity to the 
mix. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) identified a ‘hierarchy of influences’, 
or five levels that influence news content: individual preferences and 
background, organisational routines, editorial policy and other organ-
isational imperatives, extra-media influences, and ideology (at societal 
level). Allern, pointing to the need for a greater emphasis on commer-
cial news criteria, added a number of criteria, perhaps most notably that 
‘the more resources – time, personnel and budget – it costs to cover, 
follow up or expose an event, etc., the less likely it will become a news 
story’ (Allern 2002, p145).
In terms of factors specifically aimed at conflicts and peace 
processes, Hawkins (2008, pp189–202) proposed a list of factors behind 
the attention (not only of media, but also of policymakers, the public 
and academia) a conflict attracts: national/political interest, geographic 
proximity/access, ability to identify, ability to sympathise, simplicity, 
and sensationalism. Wolfsfeld (2004, pp15–23) identified immediacy, 
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drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism as factors that determine 
attention for events making up a peace process, although this focused 
on media based within the conflict zone, rather than outside it. So how 
well do these lists apply to the salience in the media agenda of the peace 
processes raised in this study? Of course, these lists are not manuals 
or checklists. Some criteria apply and others do not, and whether or 
not a particular situation will attract and sustain the media’s attention 
depends not only on how many of these criteria it meets, but also on 
how strongly each of the criteria applies, not to mention from whose 
perspective they apply – in some cases one might be enough.
Comparing the cases of the DRC and Israel–Palestine, a number of 
factors are apparent. Although the elite nation (or power elite, national/
political interest) criteria may be somewhat ambiguous, Israel can be 
said to carry an elite nation status, largely because of the importance 
conferred on it by its elite nation allies. The rise in coverage that 
accompanied the US president’s visit and proposal of the ‘road map’, 
and the rise accompanying the visits of other elites from the US, can be 
considered to serve as an example of the elite nations and elite people 
criteria. The meaningfulness/relevance/ability to identify factors can 
also apply in the Western world, not only because of the relatively high 
socioeconomic status of the participants, but also because the area of 
contestation is considered to be the Holy Land by Muslims, Jews and 
Christians alike. Continuity/follow-up are also relevant criteria – the 
conflict has always been the subject of heavy coverage and therefore it 
continues to be. 
The DRC, on the other hand, had few of these criteria to recommend 
it as a news topic. None of the factors that applied to Israel–Palestine was 
relevant in this case. There was no direct or open involvement by elites 
(nation or person), and a conflict affecting poor black people apparently 
has limited relevance for those in the affluent white-dominated West. 
The limited elite interest in the conflict in the DRC undoubtedly served 
to deter media attention. As a conflict sparked by the invasion of US/
UK allies Rwanda and Uganda, and given the mining interests of 
powerful Western corporations, attention to the situation in the DRC 
was potentially embarrassing for elite interests in the West. From the 
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elite perspective, those suffering in the DRC were not ‘worthy victims’ 
(Herman & Chomsky 1994, pp37–86). Furthermore, as the conflict 
was consistently marginalised from the outset, the trend continued 
throughout the peace process – a mark of continuity. 
It is important to note that while the threshold/magnitude criteria 
may apply to domestic news or accidents, it is not relevant in the case 
of conflict and conflict resolution. The scale of a conflict (marked, for 
instance, by death toll) is, for all intents and purposes, unrelated to the 
level of media attention it attracts. As this study confirms, conflicts with 
relatively small death tolls often attract heavy coverage, while many of 
the world’s deadliest conflicts are consistently absent from the media 
radar. The fact that the peace process for what was by far the world’s 
deadliest conflict could only attract one-twentieth at most (less than 
one-hundredth at least) of the quantity of coverage of a peace process 
aimed at resolving a conflict with a death toll hundreds of times smaller 
makes the magnitude criteria altogether irrelevant. 
The negative/bad news and good news criteria also didn’t seem to 
have a considerable impact here. In the case of Israel–Palestine, there 
was little particularly good news (the successful conclusion of a deal, 
for example), and the failure of the process was gradual – there was 
no major negative incident that suddenly destroyed the entire peace 
process. To begin with, the starting point of the ‘road map’ was not met 
with a great deal of expectation. A political cartoon by Olle Johansson 
(reprinted here) summed up the mood of the times. A battered and very 
unenthused peace dove sitting on a shot-up signboard (to the Middle 
East) says sarcastically to the readers, ‘Another peace plan … we’re all 
thrilled’. Yet coverage of each intricate part of the peace process was 
reported in detail alongside the negativity of the violence. In the case 
of the DRC, the agreement was particularly good news. Although there 
was trouble brewing in Ituri, the bilateral peace deals were conclusive, 
as was the comprehensive peace agreement in Pretoria, which led to the 
establishment of a transitional government; and the large-scale troop 
withdrawals were very visible positive effects. This end to the world’s 
deadliest conflict should have done something to offset the factors that 
prevented its coverage, but it did not.
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None of the other peace processes studied (Darfur, Kenya, Nepal) 
came close to the levels of coverage of the Israel–Palestine peace pro-
cess, but all attracted greater coverage than did the DRC peace process. 
None involved elite nations or elite people, but, importantly, in some 
cases there was elite interest in their resolution. In the case of Darfur, 
there was a degree of US policy interest, and the peace talks came at 
the peak of public interest in the US, coinciding with a series of highly 
coordinated nationwide rallies for Darfur. In the case of Kenya, an elite 
person (immediate past UN Secretary General Kofi Annan) stepped in 
as mediator. 
© Olle johansson 2003. Reproduced with permission
This is in line with studies finding that the media agenda largely 
follows the lead of the policy agenda – indexing (Bennett 1990) and (to 
a slightly lesser degree) cascading network activation (Entman 2004). 
Indexing holds that the media coverage reflects the strength of the voices 
in government. When there is consensus in government, the media 
will present that perspective; when there is debate within government, 
those perspectives will be offered; and the lack of policy voices will be 
matched by a lack of media coverage. In a somewhat more nuanced 
approach, the cascading network activation portrays agenda items 
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originating primarily from the policy elites at the top of the ‘cascade’, 
but allows for items ‘splashing’ back up to the top from the lower tiers.
Other factors helped boost coverage. While the DRC and Israel–
Palestine conflicts and peace processes were portrayed in very complex 
terms, the Darfur, Kenya and Nepal conflicts were reported in simplified 
one-on-one formats (the realities in each case were, of course, far from 
simple). Israel–Palestine is also essentially a one-on-one conflict, but 
the solution is reported in great detail and complexity. With so many 
actors at different levels with different motives and objectives, the DRC 
conflict has always been unsimplifiable. This has set it apart from other 
conflicts and can be considered a major factor in its marginalisation. In 
the case of Kenya, the element of unexpectedness/surprise also served 
as a major factor in the levels of interest. The conflict suddenly appeared 
in what was thought to be a relatively peaceful country. The media also 
attempted to connect readers to the conflict using the images already in 
their minds (meaningfulness/relevance). There were stories in The New 
York Times about the damage to the tourism industry and the dangers 
faced by marathon runners.
Commercial news criteria also need to be considered as major 
factors determining the levels of coverage; most notably, the proximity 
of news bureaus to the events. The long-term interest in the Israel–
Palestine conflict has resulted in the stationing of numerous bureaus 
and reporters; most in Israeli-controlled West Jerusalem. As such, 
newsgathering is possible for however long a peace process goes on 
at little marginal expense. The same can be said of the Kenya process. 
Nairobi is one of the few places in Africa in which Western journalists 
are stationed. Jeffrey Gettleman, for example, reported for The New York 
Times on the conflict and peace process in Kenya from the newspaper’s 
already established bureau there. There are no such bureaus in the 
vicinity of the DRC, making decisions to gather news from there 
expensive ones, with approved expeditions measured in days, not 
months. A short-term focus on the DRC peace process can be seen in 
The Times (UK), for example, with the bulk of the reporting during this 
period (the peace agreement with Rwanda) coinciding with a tour of 
the region by Africa-based journalist Michela Wrong. 
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Admittedly, the peace process for the DRC was conducted largely 
in relatively accessible South Africa (The New York Times has a bureau 
in Johannesburg), but covering both the peace process and the situation 
on the ground would have required two reporters. Such a split did not, 
however, prevent substantive coverage of the peace talks for Darfur 
taking place in Nigeria. Distance did little to stop coverage of the 
sensational volcanic eruption in eastern DRC. In each of the newspapers 
studied, less than one week of coverage of the eruption and its effects 
exceeded that of months of coverage of the peace process. In the case of 
The Australian, coverage of the eruption easily exceeded coverage of the 
entire 18-month peace process. A short stay to cover a sensational event 
(parachute journalism) makes good business sense, but a long stay to 
cover a peace process does not.
Finally, the influence of the elite news media on other news 
media, or intermedia agenda-setting (McCombs 2004, pp113–17), 
needs to be considered. With few foreign correspondents, smaller 
newspapers rely on other more powerful newspapers and agencies not 
only for their newsgathering capacity, but also for their judgements 
on newsworthiness. This pack journalism mentality results in a 
convergence of news agendas – many different newspapers end up 
reporting on the same peace process. Although information is certainly 
available from reputable sources (primarily news agencies) on events 
occurring in the DRC, a newspaper is unlikely to buy this news and 
publish it unless it is already considered by more powerful news sources 
as being newsworthy.
Conclusion
It is no secret that the Western mainstream media marginalise conflict 
in Africa (or Africa in general, for that matter), giving much greater 
coverage to conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. This chapter has 
examined how these trends applied to peace processes, comparing the 
media coverage of the peace process in the DRC over the course of the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the conclusion of a series of comprehen-
sive peace agreements, with part of the peace process in Israel–Palestine 
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(the announcement of the ‘road map’ in 2003) and, to a lesser degree, 
with peace processes in Darfur, Kenya and Nepal. 
It found that, of the peace processes examined here, the DRC was 
by far the least covered. This was despite the fact that the conflict in 
the DRC was a multinational affair with a death toll hundreds of times 
greater than the others, and despite the scale of the achievements made 
possible by the successful conclusion of the peace agreements there – the 
withdrawal of tens of thousands of foreign troops and the establishment 
of an inclusive transitional government. Furthermore, the study found 
that, relative to the coverage of the violent phase of the conflict, the 
proportion of coverage of the peace process was considerably less for 
the DRC than it was for Israel–Palestine. In fact, the coverage of the 
peace process in the DRC was so little and so sporadic, that the media 
did not identify the organised set of events leading up to the peace 
agreement as a peace process. They were reported simply as peace deals 
or agreements.
The reasons for this marginalisation are complex, but include 
the lack of involvement and interest of elite nations and persons, the 
perceived failure of a predominantly white and affluent audience 
to identify, the sheer complexity, the fact that the conflict has been 
consistently marginalised in the past (continuity), commercial factors 
such as the lack of reporters permanently stationed in the vicinity, and 
the gravitational pull of powerful agenda-setters in the media.
Peace journalism focuses on the manner in which conflict, violence 
and peace are covered by the media. It is an approach that is not only 
critical in enhancing the public’s understanding of conflict, but one that 
can also encourage and promote efforts towards peace. In this sense, it 
is certainly a worthy pursuit. At the same time, it is important not to 
lose sight of the fact that the majority of armed conflicts, and, critically, 
the peace processes aimed at ending them, are rarely covered by the 
media in any form. With a view to furthering understanding of these 
conflicts and enhancing the exploration of scenarios that will lead to a 
positive outcome, perhaps room can be made in the peace journalism 
movement for encouraging improvements in the quantity, as well as 
quality, of journalism related to armed conflict and its resolution.
Expanding peace journalism
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